vbid/9783030879426

Description

This book takes a new approach to the debate on causal pluralism in the philosophy of biology by asking how useful pluralism is instead of debating its truth.� The core thesis in this work is that many problems do not hinge on the question of whether or not we subscribe to causal pluralism.� As one step in this central argument, the author develops an account that reasonably distinguishes pluralism from monism; in another step he studies cases that allegedly motivate causal pluralism in biology.� Examining these cases shows how pluralism is often irrelevant and why pursuing pluralism is sometimes dangerous, since it may generate pseudo solutions to persistent philosophical problems. This book offers a systematic approach to this subject matter and argues that we might have overestimated the significance of the monism-pluralism distinction and at the same time failed to see the risks of pursuing causal pluralism.Typham this is the title: Causal Pluralism in the Life Sciences A Journey Along the Frontiers of Conceptual Plurality